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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
appellant submits the within Reply Brief in response to new
matters raised by the respective appellees.
by the two appellees are quite different.

The issues raised
Point I of this

Brief replies to the arguments raised by defendant Salt Lake
County.

Point II replies to the arguments raised by defendant

Truman G. Madsen.
POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY WHICH IS FULLY RIPE FOR THE GRANTING
OF JUST COMPENSATION
Salt Lake County has done an excellent job of camouflaging
the issues by submitting and arguing a host of irrelevant
facts, sideshows and non-issues.

A purpose of this Reply Brief

will be to distinguish between these non-issues raised by Salt
Lake County and the real issue on appeal - namely the issue of
ripeness.
A.
1.

What This Appeal Is Not About

This is not a case that hinges upon subtle

distinctions between "facially" or "as applied" takings.

This

involves a regulatory taking which if applied renders the
property useless for any viable purpose.

The reduction in

value from $95,000 to zero has never even been challenged.

If

the property is useless everyone would agree that a taking has
occurred no matter what you call it.

Of course, Salt Lake

County claims that it has never unconditionally denied
appellant a building permit, but this goes to the issue of
ripeness as discussed later.
2.

This appeal is not about arbitrary or capricious

decision-making as argued by Salt Lake County at page 7 and at
page 12 of its brief where it asserts that this is to be "the
key issue on appeal".

It is true that in plaintiff's Complaint

he alleged, as a separate ground, that the denial of a building
permit was arbitrary and capricious.

But the appeal has not

focused on that issue (in fact it wasn't even raised as a
point).

When private property is taken by a governmental

entity the taker cannot be relieved of its constitutional
obligation to pay just compensation by attempting to show that
the taking was not arbitrary or capricious.

No authority was

offered by Salt Lake County in support of such an outlandish
position.
3.

This case does not turn upon the sophistication level

of Jason Arnell or the lack of diligence in discovering the
slope ordinance or in making inquiry before purchasing the
property.

Salt lake County continues to argue such facts, and

at page 1 depicts him as a property "developer" (not true or
supported by the record) and as an experienced builder
(although it is acknowledged at page 14 that his experience in
slope construction was limited to one building in Idaho where

he had no involvement in determining whether a slope ordinance
existed).

But all of these facts are irrelevant because the

case of Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct.
2448 (2001) laid to rest any question regarding the
constitutional rights of grantees.
stands in the shoes of his grantor.

Under Palazzolo a grantee
This is true regardless of

whether the grantee knew or did not know of the slope ordinance
when he purchased the property.

Here it is undisputed that

Arnell did not know, but again, this whole area of argument is
a diversion having no relevance.
4.

This case is not about compliance with building codes

or safety regulations.

From day one plaintiff has always

acknowledged that if he were to have been permitted to build on
the sloped lot he would be required to comply with all County
building regulations, plan reviews and approvals, inspections,
and safety and engineering requirements.

There was never any

expectation or attempt by plaintiff to be relieved of these
requirements and such has been made clear from the beginning.
5.

Another non-issue continuously argued by Salt Lake

County is that the County Council is not bound to follow the
recommendation of its Hearing Officer.

Appellant does not

dispute the County's position in this regard.

Appellant merely

argues that the County Council improperly manufactured new
findings of fact without taking evidence and without limiting

its findings to those facts in the Hearing Officer's record.
That being the case, the County's attempt to justify its
findings are rather shallow to say the least.

But these

findings are very important in understanding the County's
position as to the real reasons for its denial of relief.
B.
1.

What This Appeal ^s About

The Issue.

The appeal against Salt Lake County

involves the issue of ripeness.

It is undisputed that

appellant has been deprived of the use of his property.

Salt

Lake County now claims that it has never unconditionally
prohibited appellant from building on his subdivision lot, and
has only done so because of the lack of site specific design
detail that would enable it to determine if the building can be
safely built.

Appellant has relied upon Palazzolo vs. Rhode

Island, supra, and other authorities cited at Point IB of his
opening brief for the proposition that a case becomes ripe for
the payment of compensation once the governmental agency makes
it clear the extent of development that will be permitted;
thereafter ripeness rules do not require the submission of
repeated applications.

It is appellant's position that the

reasons given in Salt Lake County's formal decision for the
denial of relief are not the same as those argued by counsel in
this case.

The failure to submit detailed site or

architectural plans was only an incidental reason for the use

denial.

Salt Lake County purely and simply did not want to set

a precedent for the building of structures on steep canyon
slopes under any conditions, and this intent is clearly
manifest by the plain language of the decision.

These reasons

are summarized at page 20 of appellant's opening brief (and the
full County decision is attached as Addendum 5 of the opening
brief).

They include reasons that appellant could never comply

with, because he cannot change the nature or the topography of
his lot.

That being so, the ripeness doctrine has been

satisfied.
2.

Diamond B-Y Ranches vs. Tooele County.

The case of

Diamond B-Y Ranches vs. Tooele County, 2004 UT App. 135, 91
P.3d 831, came to counsel's attention from the Utah Advance
Sheets shortly after appellant's opening brief had been filed.
This is a case squarely in point supporting appellant's
position.

Upon learning of the case, counsel immediately

notified the other parties and put them on notice that he
intended to rely upon Diamond B-Y Ranches in his reply brief
(see counsel's letter of August 6, 2004, attached hereto as
Addendum 1 ) . Salt Lake County refers to this case beginning at
page 21 of its brief and admits that at first blush it is
strikingly similar to the instant case.

It then attempts to

distinguish the case, but as will be shown, the distinctions
actually make appellant's case stronger - not weaker.

The facts of Diamond B-Y Ranches are rather straightforward.

In that case Tooele County denied Diamond the right

to operate a gravel pit, thereby rendering its property
useless.

In defense of Diamond's takings claim, Tooele County

claimed that the use permit had not been unconditionally denied
on the merits, but on procedural grounds.

Particularly it was

claimed that Diamond never made any meaningful attempt to
provide an environmental impact study (EIS) upon which the
County could determine the appropriateness of approving the use
permit.

Diamond had initially sought to obtain an EIS, but,

according to the court, understandably determined that it would
be futile to spend over $100,000 for a report in light of the
County's opposition.

The primary objection to operating the

gravel pit had consistently been the property's proximity to
the town of Stockton and the resultant health, safety and
welfare concerns, which, according to the court, was something
that an EIS could not change.

Thus, the decision of the trial

court was reversed and the element of ripeness was determined
to have been met.
Diamond B-Y Ranches and the instant case are very much the
same.

There, Tooele County denied a use permit and claimed at

trial that an EIS had not been provided; its real reason for
the denial, as reflected in the minutes of the County
Commission, was the proximity of the gravel pit to the town of

Stockton and the potential health and safety concerns.

Here,

Salt Lake County denied a building permit and claimed at trial
that detailed design data had not been provided; the real
reasons for the denial as reflected by the decision of the
County Council, was its reluctance to depart from the Wasatch
Canyon Master Plan, its fear of what it perceived as a bad
precedent, and the multiple health and safety concerns as
outlined in the decision.

The two cases are on all fours.

Salt Lake County has attempted to distinguish the cases by
arguing (1) that in Diamond B-Y Ranches there was a good faith
effort to obtain the EIS, and (2) the court considered other
evidence from minutes of the County Commission to determine the
"actual reasons" for the denial of the permit.

As to (1) the

whole rationale of the opinion has nothing to do with good
faith.

Further, the facts showed that there was abandonment of

follow-up efforts to obtain the EIS because of the cost.

Also

here, there is no evidence whatsoever that appellant has not
acted in good faith.1

1

Arnell has always claimed that he fully cooperated with Salt
Lake County in providing requested materials, and it is
unfortunate that the record certified by Salt Lake County does
not contain the materials that were provided. Shafer's
Affidavit that materials furnished were of a general or
conclusionary nature is itself conclusionary. But all of this
is irrelevant in light of the County's ultimate decision and
the reasons given therein for the denial of a building permit.

As to (2), in the instant case there is no reason to look
for outside intent evidence because here the decision itself
goes into great detail describing the reasons for the denial.
That is why the instant case is so much stronger than Diamond
B-Y Ranches.

The 6 page written decision was solemnly signed

off by the Chairman of the Salt Lake County Council and
concurred in by eight Councilmen.

Salt Lake County has made it

clear to Jason Arnell that it will not approve development for
a multitude of reasons.

And most of those reasons have

absolutely nothing to do with the submission of detailed
architectural plans or structural design proposals.

Thus,

under both federal (Palazzolo) and state (Diamond B-Y Ranches)
law, the case is fully ripe for the payment of just
compensation as required by both constitutions.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RESCIND HIS CONTRACT
WITH APPELLEE MADSEN
As noted in the prior briefs, appellant has relied upon
three grounds in support of recision.

These include (1) mutual

mistake of fact, (2) breach of covenant under the warranty
deed, and (3) breach of implied warranty of fitness for
purpose.

Each if these grounds would independently support the

recision, and appellant need prevail on only one.
however, are meritorious.

All,

A.

Mistake.

Madsen's one and only argument to rebut

appellant's mistake theory is that the doctrine of mistake
applies only to mistakes of "existing facts".

This statement

of law is not disputed by appellant, and in fact appellant
relies upon the same authorities as Madsen with respect to the
broad concept.

But we aren't dealing here with a mistake of

some future expectation.
existing fact.

We are dealing with a mistake of an

A basic assumption of the contract was that the

lot being purchased was a buildable lot.

The trial court

mistakenly considered the failure to obtain a building permit
as not being an existing fact.

But the failure to obtain a

building permit was not the mistaken fact; rather, it was the
existence of the slope ordinance which made the lot
unbuildable, which existed at the time of the contract, and
which neither the buyer nor the seller knew about.

The failure

to obtain a building permit was merely a later event which
rather conclusively established the materiality of the mistake.
It is not uncommon for courts to allow recision in cases
where the parties have mutually mistaken beliefs about zoning
or building restrictions.

Appellant has argued some of these

cases beginning at page 30 of his opening brief, and
particularly has relied upon Rancourt vs. Verba, 678 A.2d, 886
(VT 1996), Lovier vs. Meteye, 260 So.2d, 377 (LA 1972), and
Millman vs. Swan, 127 S.E. 166 (VA 1925), all being directly in

point.

The trial court ignored these cases in its decision.

Likewise, Madsen totally ignores and makes no reference to them
in his brief.

Nor does he offer a single contra authority.

Appellant's mistake theory is supported by respectable legal
authorities, which have been presented to the court completely
unrebutted.
B.

Breach of Covenant Under Warranty Deed.

Appellant's

position with respect to this point is fully briefed under
Point III of his opening brief.

Except as may be noted under D

herein, there is nothing new to address.

Should the court see

any need to reach this point, it simply will have to decide
whether to strictly follow some rather narrow language from a
couple of cases that are not factually similar, or whether to
apply the broader and more modern definition of what
constitutes an encumbrance.

It is difficult for appellant to

understand why a restriction that renders a property useless
for any viable purpose is not an encumbrance.
C.

Implied Warranty of Fitness.

In this case the trial

court brushed off appellant's implied warranty of fitness
argument in a one line comment that "Utah does not recognize a
claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability in real
estate sales" citing Snow Flower Homeowners Association vs.
Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 UT App. 207, 31 p.3d 576.
likewise cites Snow Flower as being controlling.

Appellee
However, Snow

Flower is distinguishable from the instant case.

Snow Flower

involved a claim for various construction defects and building
code violations which it claimed rendered certain condominium
units to be uninhabitable.

Although the action included a

claim for breach of an implied warranty of fitness, the court
carefully noted both at footnote 1 and at page 582 of the
Opinion, that the claim for fitness, based upon the undisputed
facts, was undistinguishable from the claims of inhabitability.
Thus, the decision proceeded on a habitability theory, not a
fitness theory, and the case of American Towers Owners
Association vs. CCI Mechanical, Inc. 930 P.2d, 1182 (Utah 1996)
was deemed to be dispositive.
The instant case does not involve the issue of
habitability, as no structure is involved in which to inhabit.
This is strictly a claim involving the implied warranty of
fitness.

The property itself was not fit for the purpose in

which it was sold - namely to construct a residence.

That

being so, the habitability cases do not apply and the issue
before the court becomes whether Utah recognizes an implied
warranty of fitness in connection with real estate
transactions.

The post-American Towers case of Fennell vs.

Green, 2003 UT App. 291, 77 P.3d 339, implies that it does, as
do the other authorities cited under Point IV of appellant's
opening brief.

D.

Other Arguments Raised by Madsen.

Madsen has made

other arguments throughout his brief which he claims would
preclude appellant from the remedy of recision.

These include

an argument that the obtaining of a variance is still viable;
that appellant failed to make any diligent inquiry regarding
building restrictions before purchasing the lot; that the
merger doctrine would defeat appellant's claim; that the
doctrine of caveat emptor applies; and that there was no
contract between the parties to rescind.

These arguments will

be responded to in the following paragraphs.
The buildability argument is basically the very same
argument made by Salt Lake County, namely that its reason for
denying a building permit was merely because appellant did not
provide detailed design information and that the lot is in fact
buildable.

That argument is fully addressed under Point I

which clearly establishes the real reasons for the denial reasons that are impossible to comply with.

In addition, the

authorities relied upon by appellant which support recision
based upon a mistaken belief as to zoning and regulatory
matters do not require a party to make heroic efforts to change
the zoning or to escape the regulation as a condition of
recision.

Appellant has fought this battle against Salt Lake

County for more than four years, and is not required to start
over.

With respect to the claim that appellant failed to make
reasonable inquiry, appellant does not challenge the basic
concept that further inquiry may be expected if circumstances
exist that would put a reasonable person on notice of a
potential problem.

The weakness of Madsen's position is that

he cannot come up with any fact that would cause a reasonable
person to make further inquiry.

Indeed, the lot was in a

platted residential subdivision.
in the usual and customary manner.

The purchase was accomplished
The closing was handled by

a title company and a standard owner' s policy of title
insurance was issued.

Appellant observed other residences

already in existence along the same slope in the subdivision.
Just because appellant happens to be a builder and knows that
one must obtain a building permit before building a home
doesn't require him, in the absence of something to put him on
notice, to read all of the County ordinances before buying a
subdivision lot.
does anyone else.

Real estate lawyers don't do this and neither
Nor is it common practice to apply for a

building permit before one buys a residential subdivision lot.
Madsen can't point to a single thing Madsen did that was
unreasonable except for his bald assertions that because Arnell
is a builder he somehow should have known.

Madsen himself

owned the property for twenty-one years and also owned other
lots in the same subdivision.

It just isn't very persuasive

for a seller without knowledge of building restrictions who
owned the lot for twenty-one years to expect that a buyer
should know more than he does.

Again, it is undisputed that

neither party knew of the slope restrictions and both parties
entered into the transaction under the assumption that the
subdivision lot was a buildable lot.

That being so, and the

understanding of both parties being a basic assumption of the
contract, appellant is entitled to rescind.
Appellant is somewhat bewildered in attempting to
understand how the merger doctrine applies to this case.

The

merger doctrine is simply to the effect that provisions of a
preliminary or antecedent contract are merged into a warranty
deed and extinguished.
742.

Spears vs. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d,

But the whole concept of merger is irrelevant here.

Appellant is making no attempt to enforce the terms of a merged
or extinguished preliminary agreement.

His action is based

upon a mutual mistake of fact and upon the Warranty Deed
itself.
mistake.

Warranty deeds are routinely rescinded for mutual
Madsen hasn't cited a single authority to the

contrary and in the absence of such authority his merger
argument should not be given any further credibility.
Nor does the doctrine of caveat emptor apply.

Madsen

relies solely upon the case of Loveland vs. Orem City Corp.,
746 P.2d, 763 (Utah 1987).

Loveland involves the wrongful

death of a child who drowned in an open canal that bordered on
the property.

The court merely held under a caveat emptor

reasoning that in the absence of express agreements a purchaser
of land is expected to make his own examination of the
condition of the land and generally is not liable for harm
resulting to the purchaser or others from defective conditions
that exist at the time of the transfer.
with concepts of tort liability.

Loveland deals only

It has absolutely nothing to

do with rescissions of contracts, and under no stretch of the
imagination could ever be interpreted to change traditional
contract principles of mistake or warranty.

Further, Madsenfs

caveat emptor argument was not raised in the trial court and is
inappropriate to raise on appeal.
And finally, Madsen's no contract theory is baffling to
say the least.

Madsen seems to be saying that because there

was no preliminary contract that preceded the cash/deed
transaction there was no contract to rescind.

In other words,

his argument is that an executed contract, as opposed to an
executory contract, can no longer be rescinded.

If any such

principle exists, appellant has never heard of it, and
certainly Madsen has offered not authority for such an
unorthodox position.

CONCLUSION
As shown under Point I herein there has been an
unconstitutional taking of the subject property and the case is
ripe for the payment of just compensation.

In addition,

appellant is entitled to rescind his contract with appellee
Madsen on any one of the three grounds shown in this brief.
Based thereon, the summary judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.

In doing so, appellant's Motion for Summary

Judgment should be granted and appellee's respective Motions
for Summary Judgment should be denied.
DATED THIS

;g

day of October, 2004.

David E. West
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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Dear Don:
While catching up on my Advance Repor t reading yesterday, I
across the case of Diamond B-Y Ranches vs. Tooele County, 498
:.».h Advance Report 32
I wasn't aware of this case when I prepared
appellant's brief. This case appears to be on all fours with our
position in Arnell vs. Salt Lake County, and I believe should be
controlling in the Court of Appeals.
I obvi ously will be citi ng thi s case when I fi*^ ,x fc r .
brief,, bi it thought I shou 1 d caJ 1 i t to your attention xn the event
you wish to address it. i n your brief.
A copy of the decision is enclosed.
Very truly yours,
/^

>

Da \ f i d E. West
DEW.cs
cc:

jy|r> B a r n a r d N. Madsen
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